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WHO PUTS THE PUBLIC IN THE PUBLIC GOOD?:
A COMMENT ON CASS
CLAYTON P. GILLETTE*
With characteristic comprehensiveness, Professor Ronald Cass has pro-
vided us with a compendium of mechanisms for privatization and a justifi-
cation of their use.1 Eschewing the easy lure of binary choices, he suggests
that the decision to employ public or private avenues to accomplish optimal
allocation of public goods and services must ultimately rest on a variety of
factors. Captured within the rubric of comparative advantage, these factors
demand that we assign any particular activity that affects the public interest
to the sector that best navigates between the Scylla of rent-seeking and the
Charybdis of agency costs.
I have little disagreement with this general approach to the issue of
privatization. I want to focus, however, on some tendencies that might un-
dermine initial assumptions about the advantages of private and public sec-
tors in particular situations. Towards this end, I want to concentrate on the
allocation function of government. Of the functions government serves, ef-
ficiently allocating resources would appear most susceptible to some mea-
sure of privatization. Government intervention in this area is largely
intended to compensate for the failure of private markets to overcome
problems of free riding and nonrival consumption. Only the most fanatical
adherents to the theory of the night watchman state would deny a govern-
mental role in this task. But one may be far more of a statist and still
believe that government could satisfy its obligations to ensure optimal allo-
cation of goods and services without direct involvement in their produc-
tion.2 Government may instead assign the relevant production task to
private enterprise.3 Alternatively, government may intervene to replace a
failed market for production, but replicate private pricing mechanisms by
charging beneficiaries of the service on a marginal or opportunity cost basis
rather than financing the service through general tax revenues. 4 At the lo-
cal level, both private service provision and market pricing are common-
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
1. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Laws, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449 (1988).
2. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 9 (4th
ed. 1984).
3. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 545 (1985) (government
can 
"
'[c] ontract out' by hiring private firms to provide the service .... ").
4. See Gillette & Hopkins, Federal User Fees: 4 Legal and Economic Analysis, 67 B.U.L.
REV. 795, 800-01 (1987).
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place.' If there remain reasons for concern about privatization in the
allocation area, all the more concern may be appropriate in the privatiza-
tion of distributional functions that Professor Cass warily suggests might be
attempted.
I. THE REJECTION OF FORMALISM
Certainly, if we are concerned about optimal resource allocation, there
seems little reason to assign one sector a monopoly based on formalistic
conceptions of "public" and "private" that bear little relationship to fulfill-
ment of that objective.' As Cass indicates, there is little principled basis on
which to salvage any immutable dividing line between activities that must
be retained within the governmental sphere and those susceptible to priva-
tization. The demise of the governmental-proprietary distinction recog-
nizes that any attempt to carve out a finite division between public and
private activities is doomed to failure.7 The Supreme Court's most recent
foray into the realm of governmental powers, beginning with National
League of Cities v. Userys aid mercifully abandoned in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,9 appeared to find particular hope in
the purported certainties of "tradition" and "traditional governmental ac-
tivities.""° The inevitable failure of such a test is apparent from any histori-
cal perspective on the issue of governmental activity.1 Far from being
linear, the "tradition" of American government has been intermittent
5. See Savas, Policy Analysis for Local Government: Public vs. Private Refuse Collection, 3
PoL'Y ANALYSIS 49 (1977).
6. This is not necessarily to reject formalistic distinctions in all situations. Formalism may
often times serve as a surrogate for conclusions reached intuitively, or may suggest certain shared
concerns, or may be appropriate where having a rule is necessary to guide conduct notwithstand-
ing that the rule thus derived may diverge from rules judged by some other standard, such as
efficiency. See Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. ofAmerica and Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extra-Territorial State Legislation, 85 MICH L. REv. 1865
(1987).
7. See Wells & Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law,
66 VA. L. REv. 1073 (1980); see also New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
8. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). While this line of cases nominally involved the scope of federal gov-
ernment activity under the tenth amendment, underlying the Court's analysis was the view of
whether certain activities were susceptible to regulation or intervention by any level of
government.
9. 469 U.S. 528, reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 (1985).
10. See, eg., United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 284-89 (1981).
11. See, e.g., 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS 1774-1861 (rev. ed. 1969). See
also Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of
City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 83.
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entwinement with private enterprise, not simply through regulation, but
also through systematic subsidization and operation of commercial enter-
prises.12 These relationships should not be viewed as historical anomalies.
If we are at all solicitous of the view that state and local governments serve
as laboratories for experiment, then one would endorse such a dynamic re-
lationship between public and private enterprise.13 That the experiment
vacillates between governmental intervention into and government isolation
from "essentially" private functions may reflect little more than alterations
in social perceptions of the entity best capable of efficiently delivering de-
sired services.
Indeed, the swings between privatization and intervention may consti-
tute on a more global scale what Albert Hirschman has described as the
"shifting involvements" of individuals between public and private activity
as they find disappointment with their current state. 14 In the late nine-
teenth century, social shifts away from public funding of new enterprises,
such as railroads, followed periods in which unkept promises of those who
benefited from government largesse generated substantial tax burdens for
the taxpaying public.15 The subsequent laissezfaire period gave way to re-
newed calls for government intervention when private markets appeared
incapable of self-regulation and staving off economic depression. Current
calls for privatization emerge from concern that public regulation has un-
duly catered to the interests of the regulated and interfered with market
incentives. 6 These ideological shifts suggest that there is little sacrosanct in
the allocation of specific functions to the public or private sector. 17 Instead,
our selection of one sector rather than another may reflect our level of satis-
faction (or dissatisfaction) with the performance of the last actor assigned
the task.'8
These historical shifts, however, send an ambiguous message. Advo-
cates of privatization may receive substantial solace from the dilution of any
dividing line between public and private activities because it removes the
12. L. HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA 1776-
1860 (1948).
13. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
14. A. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC ACTION
(1982).
15. See Gillette, Reinterpreting "Public Purpose"- The Judiciary Strikes Back, 6 MUN. FIN.
J. 61 (1985).
16. See, e.g., Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211
(1976); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
17. On the ideology ofshifts from public to private and back, see A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note
14, at 66-68, 121-30.
18. For a discussion of this "rebound effect," see id. at 80-82.
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formidable barrier of "intrinsic" governmental functions. The disappear-
ance of any inexorable dividing lines leaves the full array of activities cur-
rently occupied by government open to private takeover. But if private
enterprise may act in areas previously occupied by government, then pre-
sumably - within nebulous constraints such as the guaranty clause 9 -
government may reciprocate. Certainly, judicial approval of ventures run-
ning from state operation of banks2 ° to state development of alcohol plants
for energy generation21 and the justification of new state ventures by refer-
ence to an expanding definition of "public purpose" expenditures,22 sug-
gests a relatively open-ended competition between public and private
sectors to occupy any given activity. That, of course, raises all the more
poignantly the question that Professor Cass has presented us: how are we
to determine the appropriate occupant for any given activity?
As Cass recognizes, the elusive answer to that question must rest on
some rough approximation of which group of actors will diverge least from
a conception of optimal allocation. Without saying so directly, Professor
Cass seems to be concerned with the issue of which sector will best serve the
"public interest." That inherently ambiguous phrase promises little in our
quest for a substantive standard of what government ought to be doing, or
- in the context of privatization - not doing. But Cass implicitly adopts a
proceduralist approach to the issue; his factors attempt to ensure that deci-
sionmakers are acting in a manner that weds them to concerns that tran-
scend narrow self-interest. Oddly, however, after properly rejecting
formalistic distinctions for public and private activities, Cass invokes the
same categories in his search for the ideal decisionmaking process. His dis-
cussion of the nondelegation doctrine reintroduces the public/private dis-
tinction that he has just rejected by suggesting that certain decisions must
be made within the former realm. He thereby understates the real concern
that informs the doctrine - the desire to place decisionmaking authority in
19. Although it is a generally understood principle of state and federal constitutional law that
governmental entities can spend funds only for "public purposes," the textual predicate of that
requirement is often elusive. Some courts purport to locate the requirement in the due process
clause of the state constitution. See, e.g., State ex rel. State Reclamation Bd. v. Clausen, 110
Wash. 525, 531, 188 P. 538, 541 (1920). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has discovered the public
purpose requirement in the federal constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government.
See City of West Allis v. County of Milwaukee, 39 Wis. 2d 356, 376, 159 N.W.2d 36, 46 (1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1064 (1969) (citing Heimerl v. Ozaukee County, 256 Wis. 151, 158, 40
N.W.2d 564, 567-68 (1949)).
20. Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 235 (1920).
21. State ex rel. Douglas v. Thone, 204 Neb. 836, 286 N.W.2d 249 (1979).
22. See, e.g., Massachusetts Home Mortgage Fin. Agency v. New England Merchants Nat'l
Bank, 376 Mass. 669, 382 N.E.2d 1084 (1978) (tracing history of state government involvement in
housing area over previous century).
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the hands of those most likely to consider all the costs and benefits that
emerge from the process.23
Certainly this objective motivates the delineation of those factors that
Cass subsequently relies on to allocate responsibility; agency costs and rent-
seeking are problematic only insofar as they induce decisionmakers to ig-
nore external costs in the pursuit of self-interest. That this is our real con-
cern in designating decisionmaking authority in the area of resource
allocation seems apparent from the legal constraints on decisionmakers who
wish to abdicate their function. Prohibitions against delegation do not
arise, as Cass suggests, from a concern for "assigning functions from gov-
ernment to private parties .... 24 Nor is the anti-delegation argument nec-
essarily predicated on "a notion of . . . functions that are essentially
governmental .... 25 Rather, the concern is that decisionmakers have suffi-
cient incentives to consider all the effects of their decision. It may be irrele-
vant whether those incentives arise from political accountability
(decisionmakers who face voters at subsequent elections) or from market
mechanisms (decisionmakers who face consumers or employees). Where
decisions are made by those unaccountable - either through the private or
the political market - to those potentially adversely affected, there is little
reason to believe that the interests of those parties have been considered in
the decision.26
If internalization of externalities is the concern that undergirds con-
straints on delegation, the public/private dichotomy plays no particular
role in defining the application of the doctrine. Neither public nor private
sector decisionmakers have a monopoly over decisions that fail to consider
all adverse effects. Thus, we would be no more confident (and perhaps less
so) if decisions for the city of Boston concerning electricity supply were
made by the public officials of the city of Seattle than if they were made by
the private officials of the Boston Edison Company. When, for instance, the
Supreme Court of Washington invalidated contracts in which municipali-
ties had deputized another entity to exercise substantial discretion over
matters that significantly affected municipal resources, it did so notwith-
standing that the deputy was another political division of the state. It was
23. I mean this criticism to suggest little more than an oversight. That Professor Cass recog-
nizes the importance of selecting a decision maker who can best internalize all costs and benefits is
not only implicit in the work under discussion, but also explicit in his own writing. See Cass,
Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1110, 1135-38 (1981).
24. Cass, supra note 1, at 497.
25. Id. at 498.
26. See, ag., Buchanan & Faith, Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities, 24
J.L. & ECON. 95 (1981).
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sufficient that the municipalities had abdicated their own position as custo-
dians for the welfare of their own residents.27 The interests of the delegate
could not be expected to coincide with those of the residents who would be
affected by the decision. Notwithstanding the controversial setting of that
case,28 it incontrovertibly acknowledges the vitality of the nondelegation
doctrine at the state and local level.29 If the doctrine's survival is predi-
cated on a deeper reluctance to entrust decisions to those with insufficient
incentives to consider the adverse effects of their conduct, it has no neces-
sary implication for privatization. Should private providers succeed in
overcoming our hesitation, for example, by acting in areas where negative
externalities are likely to be minimal, doctrinal rigidity should not serve as a
further obstacle to a delegation defensible on allocative grounds.
II. THE RISK OF Too MUCH PRIVATIZATION
The search for ideal decision processes, then, is appropriately concerned
less with formalism than with neutralizing the opportunistic or strategic
behavior of decisionmakers. Presumably the sector that promises best to
neutralize self-interest (embodied in agency costs and rent-seeking) is the
one to which we should commit any task intended to further public interest.
Cass' analysis to reach that point, however, seems incomplete. His inquiry
is directed solely at the implementation stage, that is, whether the private or
public sector, once assigned a particular function, will implement it in a
manner that coincides most closely with public interest. If we recognize the
importance of behavioral biases, however, we must also ask how self-inter-
est induces divergence from public interest in the initial decision to reassign
a government function to the private sector. Here, self-interest suggests
that an inordinate (from the public interest perspective) number of assign-
ments will be made to the private sector. The reason should be clear from
traditional literature concerning collective action and public goods. That
learning indicates how tendencies to free ride, high information costs, and
incentives for expropriation cause particular goods and services to be over-
supplied or undersupplied. In short, on such matters the market will de-
liver to us "the back of the invisible hand.",
30
27. Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329
(1983).
28. The case involved the invalidation of contracts that supported bonds issued by the Wash-
ington Public Power Supply System, then the largest issuer of municipal bonds in the country. Id.
29. See, e.g., Smith v. Spring Garden Township, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 54 (1964); Thompson v.
Smith, 119 Vt. 488, 129 A.2d 638 (1957).
30. R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 6 (1982).
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If government seeks to cure market failures in the allocation of public
goods and services, then it is important to recognize that government itself
exhibits characteristics of a public good.31 As Derek Parfit phrases it, polit-
ical problems constitute a "Contributor's Dilemma" in which cooperative
solutions are required. 32 However, since noncontributors are able to share
the benefits of the political solution along with contributors (even though
they incur none of the commersurate costs), personal incentives are skewed
toward noncontribution. Initially, one might infer from this analysis that
political solutions are undersupplied and that we are likely to have too little
governmental intervention rather than too much. This counterintuitive re-
sult suggests a problem with the theory. Deeper reflection, however, indi-
cates that governmental intervention in particular activities may be
motivated by altruists, political entrepreneurs, or client groups, whose net
effect is production of even greater than optimal levels of governmental ac-
tivity. 33 Certainly Professor Cass' concern for rent-seekers suggests such a
possibility, as those with access to the government apparatus will attempt to
appropriate it for their own welfare rather than that of the public at large.
Thus, it may be that even if we have an excessive quantum of government,
we have too little of it that is motivated by public interest.
If privatization is portrayed as a response to rent-seeking through gov-
ernment largesse, it may also be that the same phenomenon affects the ini-
tial decision to privatize. If privatization reduces agency costs and rent-
seeking within government, it (like government) exhibits characteristics of a
public good. As such, the incentive of any member of the public to assist in
achieving the appropriate level of privatization appears minimal. As with
other public goods, the beneficiary will be equally well-off allowing others
to strike the balance, assuming that others are willing to do so. Indeed,
from each potential contributor's perspective, any contribution is exclu-
sively a cost enterprise, since marginal benefits from individual contribu-
tions are nil. Thus, the rational, self-interested beneficiary will do nothing
to encourage appropriate instances of privatization or discourage inappro-
priate ones. Of course, the force of the Prisoner's Dilemma lies in its pre-
31. See Krier & Gillette, The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. L. REV.
405 (1985).
32. D. PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 64 (1984).
33. See, e.g., Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 279 (1984); H. MANNE, INDIVIDUAL CONSTRAINTS AND INCENTIVES IN GOVERN-
MENT REGULATION OF BUSINESS, IN INTERACTION OF ECONOMICS AND LAW (B. Siegan ed.
1977); Peltzman, supra note 16.
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diction that all potential beneficiaries will believe and behave similarly and
thus first-best political solutions will fail.34
Failure to achieve the optimal solution, however, is not the result of
universal inaction; rather, it results from action by those few for whom the
benefits of privatization exceed the commensurate costs. These, of course,
are likely to be the discrete, "privileged" industries that are likely to profit
from taking over functions formerly performed by government.35 If those
actors were influenced solely by altruistic tendencies that coincided per-
fectly with public interest, there would be no divergence between the level
of optimal privatization and that actually provided. This utopian solution,
however, cannot be reconciled with Cass' assumption that rent-seeking and
agency costs generate the problem in the first place. In our current context,
the upshot of the problem is that the firms that can expect to replace gov-
ernment under a regime of privatization have substantial incentives to lobby
for that course. If those adversely affected constitute the public at large -
diffuse in scope, with little to lose individually, notwithstanding substantial
aggregate loss - they are unlikely to incur the cost of resisting governmen-
tal disinvestment.
It is possible that particular groups with substantial access to govern-
mental decisionmaking about privatization could resist that process because
they receive substantial and discrete benefits from governmental involve-
ment in the activity. Employees of a governmentally run commercial enter-
prise, for instance, might have substantial interest, not shared with the
public at large, in the continuation of government involvement.36 However,
I am not arguing that privatization will always occur due to disincentives
for collective action. I am only suggesting the presence of a systematic bias
in favor of privatization - a bias that will generate skews from an ideal
assignment to the public and private sectors. Even where there does exist a
discrete group opposing privatization, its very existence suggests interests
divergent from those of the public at large, that is, the receipt of substantial
34. See R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) for both a statement of the
problems and mechanisms for resolution in repeat-play situations. On the latter, see Ellickson, Of
Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623
(1986).
35. See M. OLsoN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 48-52 (1980); see also R. HARDIN,
supra note 30, at 38-49 (1982). I am not suggesting that only these privileged groups are capable
of overcoming obstacles to collective action. See M. TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERA-
TION 8-13 (1987). I am suggesting that they have an easier time of accomplishing that task.
36. See, eg., S. BUTLER, PRIVATIZING FEDERAL SPENDING: A STRATEGY TO ELIMINATE
THE DEFICIT 79 (1985) (rent-seeking induces Amtrak employees to favor governmental role in
operation).
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rents, and thus even those situations will not be characterized by an optimal
mix of public and private participation.
Whether or not it is worth taking the risk that privatization might be
oversupplied depends on issues that defy easy answers. Professor Cass sug-
gests that our resolution of the public/private mix requires knowledge only
about ordinal rankings - which sector is more likely to neutralize opportu-
nism. But the uncertainty of oversupply suggests that deviation from ideal
resource allocation may also have an important cardinal component. If a
deviation by one of the sectors is substantial, though unlikely, while that of
another sector is minor, though more likely, our willingness to gamble with
"public interest" might be affected. There is a danger of reading Cass as
ignoring the issue of "expected divergence" (degree of divergence times
probability of divergence). Rent-seeking, on this view, consistently gener-
ates total divergence between private and public interests. Indeed, if that
were the case, and rent-seeking could be minimized through privatization in
some form, the case for the latter would be difficult to resist. Private inter-
ests that rent-seekers vindicate through government action, however, may
substantially overlap with those of the public. A diagrammatic illustration
may best make the point.
I II
A
Assume two cases, I and II, in each of which a group of actors is as-
signed the task of addressing part of a public problem. In each case, con-
duct that would satisfy the public interest is defined by circle A; circle B
represents conduct that would satisfy the private interest of the particular
assignee. Assume, for instance, that the area occupied by A in each case is
that quintessential public good - national defense - and that the private
party that defines B in each case is the manufacturer of a particular type of
[Vol. 71:534
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aircraft that is being considered by the military for purchase. Assume fur-
ther that the optimal number of such aircraft from the perspective of public
interest would be 200. That is to say, if the decision to produce were being
made by publicly interested officials who are unaffected by rent-seeking,
agency costs, or the private interest of contractors, these officials would or-
der 200 of the aircraft. Nevertheless, the optimal level of manufacturing for
the industry that constitutes circle B diverges from public interest. if the
decision about how many aircraft to construct is placed in the hands of the
manufacturer, who is presumably motivated by self-interest, it will settle on
the number represented by B. In each situation, there is some overlap be-
tween the two - private, self-interested action confers both private and
public benefits. Yet cases I and II are dramatically different from the per-
spective of tolerating rent-seeking. The shaded area of overlap in situation I
is miniscule; perhaps the manufacturers would reach optimal production at
1000 airplanes and are able to influence governmental decisionmakers to
order that number. In case II, however, there is substantial overlap - per-
haps optimal production for manufacturers would be 210 airplanes.
Certainly rent-seeking exists in both cases. But, given the costs of priva-
tization and the tendencies for over-privatization discussed above, its exist-
ence alone is not the issue. More important is the extent of overlapping
private and public interests. If case I describes the standard case, it is con-
ceivable that, even given Professor Cass' concerns, governmental provision
might be superior. Where private interest overlaps only incidentally with
public interest, a superior social strategy may be to leave decisions of provi-
sion and production solely in governmental hands.
If, on the other hand, we were confident that case II described most
situations of privatized rent-seeking, then the expected costs of over-priva-
tization may be small enough to bear the risk. Society might achieve a
more efficient level of provision by allowing private firms to produce and
entrusting to government the obligation of monitoring performance to en-
sure compliance with particular specifications.
III. PUBLIC MONITORING AND PUBLIC COMPLAINING
The possibility of a government role limited to monitoring ultimately
leads us to Professor Cass' prescription. He, too, believes that systematic
tendencies pervade the aliocative function of government. For him, these
tendencies raise concerns about the capacity of government actors to moni-
tor performance. For Cass, government actors possess insufficient incen-
tives to serve this function, and even the most benevolent suffer because
ambiguous definition of government goals beclouds the standard of success.
I believe there is some merit in this position. The adverse effects that Cass
1988]
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stresses, however, are not limited to the public realm. Both public and pri-
vate actors, for instance, are likely to skew their decisions to short-term
benefits, notwithstanding the consequent generation of excessive long-term
costs. Public officials will do so because they must produce results for their
constituents prior to the next election, notwithstanding potentially adverse
long-term effects on the public treasury.37 Private sector decisionmakers
are similarly concerned with quarterly or annual results in order to satisfy
immediate superiors, irrespective of potentially adverse effects on the maxi-
mum value of shares.38 But Professor Cass seems to suggest that as a gen-
eral matter the private sector enjoys an advantage at least in the specific
respects he discusses.
I believe that in this critique Cass paints the comparative defects of gov-
ernment with too broad of a brush. For him, the monitoring of government
performance by recipients of a service is likely to fail either because of tradi-
tional free-riding problems or because response to official defalcation is too
costly. Hence, "[m]oving out of even a relatively small jurisdiction is con-
siderably more costly than selling shares of stock .... 39 Certainly, this
view of public reactions to deviations from optimal service levels is too
restrictive. The consumer-recipients of some government services, such as
trash collection or water service, in which opportunities for free-riding are
minimal and the value of the service makes complaints cost effective, are
likely to complain about inefficiency regardless of the supplier. Others will
not complain if the public works department does not remove a large tree
limb from one's property; if my water service is unsatisfactory, there is still
less reason to ride free on the clamor of others who share my plight because
the value of improving such an essential service may be worth the cost of
complaint, even discounting for the possibility of a free-ride.
Indeed, the entire area of governmental services supported by user fees
(itself a halfway house towards privatization) is predicated on the availabil-
ity of an "identifiable beneficiary" who receives particular advantages from
the service.4' One would expect that the recipient of a benefit sufficiently
distinct and substantial to support a benefit-based user fee would also pos-
sess significant incentives to monitor the delivery of those services, notwith-
37. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1030, 1059-62 (1983).
38. See Hayes & Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, HARV. Bus. REV.
July-Aug. 1980 at 67; Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 779, 784-85 (1985).
39. Cass, supra note 1, at 482.
40. See, e.g., Central & S. Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n, 777 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Elec-
tronics Indus. Ass'n v. F.C.C., 554 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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standing the absence of "freely transferable property rights" 41 equivalent to
that of shareholders. Thus, permitting government to produce goods or
services, but shifting payment mechanisms from taxes (fraught with cross-
subsidies) to user fees could actually increase public monitoring of govern-
ment action.
Nor does Cass accurately capture the range of alternatives open to the
public when he implies that constraints on exit outside the Tiebout world
do not, as he implies, condemn recipients of governmental services to re-
signed silence. Instead, much as the case when consumers are bound to
particular products in the private market, deterioration of services may give
rise to an equally effective ameliorative of vociferous complaint, that is as
effective of an ameriorative as exit.4' Indeed, it is because exit is rendered
difficult that we can expect public monitoring and complaint to increase.
For those locked into jurisdictional boundaries by family, employment, or
other obligations, the only alternative to complaint is to deny one's state of
dissatisfaction. While that route may satisfy some, there can be little doubt
that others, similarly situated, will resolve to improve the situation.43 It is
this expectation that residents will share the perceptions and proposed solu-
tions to problems - that residents will have monitored the situation - that
induce the "takeover" attempts by political opponents. Presumably those
attempts would not be initiated if opposition political entrepreneurs did not
believe that public monitors would "sell" votes to them at the next election.
Thus, even if public managers may have less incentive to monitor perform-
ance than their private counterparts, there is little reason to believe that
consumers cannot substantially narrow the gap.
Similarly, some governmental services may be less susceptible to the am-
biguity of goals that Professor Cass suggests can increase agency costs in
the public sector. There will, of course, be substantial debate within the
National Park Service about whether the proper governmental goal is pres-
ervation of wilderness areas (reducing admissions and development regard-
less of willingness to pay by potential users), maximum availability (allow
in all who can fit on a first-come, first-serve basis), or efficiency (admit those
41. See Cass, supra note 1, at 481.
42. See A. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 305 (1970); Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Con-
trols as a Problem of LocalLegitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 837, 883-84 (1983). For a discussion of
the legal effects of constraints imposed in the non-Tiebout world, see Gillette, Equality and Vari-
ety in the Delivery of Municipal Services (Book Review), 100 HARV. L. REv. 946, 956-61 (1987).
43. See J. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA
AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1940-1975, 52-57 (1977)
(describing citizen action taken to alleviate pollution in California).
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willing to pay admission prices based on opportunity costs for the land or
market prices, such as fees charged at Disney World).' If no single policy
objective achieves primacy within a public agency, then monitoring the dis-
parate goals of public actors does become problematic. But that is a very
different point from one with which it is easily confused, that is, that gov-
ernment objectives are inherently less susceptible to measurement than the
dominant private sector objective of profit maximization. If a primary goal
does emerge from intra-agency debate, the fact that the successful objective
pursues suboptimal allocation of the relevant goods in favor of "mushier"
goals (such as "fairness") does not necessarily render performance immea-
surable or more difficult to monitor. Those alternative goals must often be
translated into programs that permit service recipients to determine
whether implicit or explicit objectives are being satisfied. If, for instance, a
local government seeks to equalize service outcomes among neighborhoods,
even at the expense of maximum aggregate service outcomes, achievement
of that goal is discernible and its desirability can be reflected in political
markets.45
Additionally, government's allocative functions seem particularly sus-
ceptible to privatization precisely because (unlike the situation just hypothe-
sized) they typically involve public goods but do not otherwise implicate
strong redistributional claims that require approval in political markets.
Governmental intervention in this sphere is predicated on a belief that cen-
tralized provision is useful to ensure efficient production of the relevant
goods. The upshot, however, is that government performance in a variety
of these areas - such as leases of grazing land, check collection through the
federal reserve system, provision of electricity by public power agencies4
6
-
is driven by a goal (efficiency) as singular as that of the private market.
But if the most one can say is that the comparative advantage of private
firms in monitoring and goal definition is less demonstrable than Cass sug-
gests, a more fundamental issue must be addressed. If governmental vul-
nerability to monitoring is similar to that of the private sector and if
governmental objectives can be as precise as those of profit-maximizing en-
44. See J. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS (1980); UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PARKS AND RECREATION: RECREATIONAL FEE AUTHORIZATIONS,
PROHIBITIONS, AND LIMITATIONS, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
LANDS, RESERVED WATER AND RESOURCE CONSERVATION, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, UNITED STATES SENATE (May 1986).
45. Behrman & Craig, The Distribution of Public Services: An Exploration of Local Govern-
ment Preferences, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 37 (1987).
46. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECTOR SURVEY ON COST CONTROL, REPORT ON USER
CHARGES (1983).
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terprises, why is government involved in the activity at all? It is hardly a
recommendation of public production to say that it will be no worse than
private. One would hope instead for some affirmative endorsement, partic-
ularly given current predilection for private supply. Some possibilities rush
to mind, but none is convincing. Natural monopolies, such as the airwaves,
could be auctioned rather than operated by or with the intervention of gov-
ernment. Even in those situations that attract government participation be-
cause of substantial start-up costs, there seems little doctrinal reason for
government to remain involved once those costs have been incurred.
My own search for a proper dividing line between public and private
functions, therefore, is hopelessly incomplete. Obviously, once we reintro-
duce the redistributional role of government into the picture, the case for
widespread privatization becomes more problematic. If we wish to deviate
from allocative goals to accomplish some alternative objectives, government
can be expected to respond more adequately than firms that have defined
their function in terms of profit-maximization. This is the lesson of Profes-
sor Cass' conclusion that public enterprise possesses a comparative advan-
tage in effecting wealth transfers. But that step is too easy an obstacle to
privatization. I wish instead to suggest a "public" component inherent even
in the allocation function that raises a caveat about too much privatization.
Government provides a common target, a focal point for many of our
concerns about matters that affect our lives. That we discuss government in
our daily lives and engage in public conversation, participation, and deci-
sionmaking reveals a desire to assert some measure of control over these
matters.47 We are expected to converse and complain publicly about gov-
ernment misconduct and to seek redress through public channels. Thus,
governmental action generates a unique language of politics ("entitle-
ments," "rights") not readily applied to private conduct. The efficiency
gains of public discussion should not be understated. Our discourse, by
virtue of being public, provides information to others that gives them a
standard by which they can judge their relative satisfaction with the provi-
sion of public goods. It is, indeed, the ability to generate information in this
manner that underlies my faith in the capacity for public monitoring, dis-
cussed above.
47. I am not suggesting that everyone participates and certainly not that all participate on all
issues. I am suggesting that the availability of opportunities to participate and the occasional use
of those opportunities signal that we consider both public discourse and the subject of that dis-
course to be important. See Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 POL. THEORY
338 (1987).
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These opportunities to share information and to seek public redress for
inadequacies in public service provisions might not readily be replicated if
these same services were provided solely through private markets. Private
conduct, or misconduct, triggers alternative sources of redress that are
more individualized and atomized. We are not accustomed to collective
complaint for private defalcation; disagreements between consumer and pri-
vate provider are typically handled through self-help rather than coopera-
tion with others. This is not to say that we could not create collective
responses to private misconduct. It is only to say that the current attitude
of private redress and absence of a forum for complaint creates comparative
disadvantages for public monitoring of private activity. The assumption
seems to be that private monitoring through market transactions will be
sufficient and that individuals disappointed with privately supplied goods
will signal their dissatisfaction by shifting their support to producers of sub-
stitutes.4 8 However successful this explanation may be where private goods
are concerned, it becomes less forceful in the area of public goods where
free riding can be expected to undermine efficient leads of withdrawal and
the presence of monopoly providers can be expected to render exit more
difficult. If the presence of private providers induces the withdrawal of pub-
lic monitors who would otherwise participate for the consumption benefits
involved in public life, the monitors who remain are likely to be those with
intense and special interests, not necessarily consonant with those of the
public at large.4 9
IV. EFFICIENCY AND PARTICIPATION IN THE
PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS
The existence of a public forum in which complaint against government
conduct is common suggests an additional, perhaps more ephemeral, diffi-
culty with privatization. In serving as a target for public discussion and
dissatisfaction, government typically provides the forum that facilitates crit-
icism. Public hearings or more informal public gatherings create a mecha-
nism for the exercise of the voice option I alluded to earlieri ° It is this
solicitude for "public space," in which individuals joined to share common
concerns, that undergirded Hannah Arendt's concern for substantial partic-
48. See A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 42, at 221-29 (1970).
49. Hence a recent finding that contracting out of social services in Massachusetts not only
failed to decrease financial outlays, but led to the creation of interest groups that focussed on
creating political support and stable financial relationships with the state rather than on the issues
for which state social services were created. See S. Smith and D. Stone, The Unexpected Conse-
quences of Privatization (1986) (unpublished manuscript).
50. See Home Rule Debate Stirs Vermoras. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1987 at 60 col. 4.
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ipation by the public.5" Opportunity for participation in public life simi-
larly lies at the root of the "public happiness" that Jefferson viewed as the
foundation of republican thought.52 I believe that the desire for a public
forum also underlies some of the resistance to the ongoing search for pri-
vate dispute resolution mechanisms to relieve the courts.53
Here, too, the private sector is at a disadvantage, if only because private
suppliers rarely provide an active forum for the expression of consumer
voice. Shareholder meetings do not serve as a surrogate. Their timing is
dictated by corporate and statutory requirements rather than salient events
that demand response. Their agenda attends to the interest of owners, not
consumers of the services the corporation provides. From the perspective
of allocative efficiency, shareholder meetings may be sufficient, as owners'
concerns for profit maximization must ultimately internalize the effects of
corporate conduct on consumers. My present concern, however, is more on
the personal effects of participation than the efficiency of the service pro-
vided. If we obtain some benefit in having a role in the process, in gathering
to complain, then a procedure that facilitates that function may be superior
to one that does not, even if the ultimate quality and quantity of service
provided is the same in either regime.54
One might contend that participatory values can compensate for some
consequent loss of efficiency, insofar as the process of participating either
fosters the autonomy of individuals or enhances their sense of community.55
Notwithstanding some personal sympathy for those objectives, I do not
want to rely on them alone for my current argument. There may be occa-
sions in which the desirability of such a trade-off should be contemplated.
But my current argument is somewhat more heroic; it suggests that the
51. H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 249 (1981).
52. Id at 248-55, A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 14, at 122.
53. See Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
54. There is vast and burgeoning literature on the effects of participation. A good survey of
the classic literature can be found in C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY
(1970). For more recent works, see Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057
(1980); Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986); Sunstein,
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
Carol Rose has recently made a related argument involving legal rules. She suggests that rules
of disparate levels of precision may blend together in their ultimate legal effect, and thus become
largely indistinguishable. Nevertheless, they retain an important rhetorical significance that "bear
sharply divergent didatic messages." Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV.
577, 610 (1988). My argument here suggests that if public and private agencies provide roughly
equal levels of service, our selection of a particular provider still says a great deal about our desire
for a public role in monitoring services.
55. See Bachrach, Interest, Participation, and Democratic Theory, in J. PENNOCK & J. CHAP-
MAN, NOMOS XVI: Participation in Politics 39 (1975).
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objectives may work in tandem. Participation may advance Professor Cass'
goals of reducing rent-seeking and enhancing efficiency. As Cass makes
clear, efficient delivery of services assumes a decisionmaking process that
internalizes the interests of all affected parties. If participatory processes
inform the interests of the recipients or provide them with opportunities to
effect those interests, one would imagine that such processes would aug-
ment other incentives for internalization.56 If, therefore, we are seriously
concerned with rent-seeking political actors, perhaps we should consider
the capacity of increased participation to create offsetting interest groups.
If the public sector more readily makes those avenues available, perhaps we
ought to consider whether that role alone justifies governmental involve-
ment in the allocation of public goods.
56. See id. at 44, 49-50.
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